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Abstract Current antitrust enforcement policy unduly
restricts physician collaboration, especially among small
physician practices. Among other matters, current
enforcement policy has hindered the ability of physicians to
implement efﬁcient healthcare delivery innovations, such as
the acquisition and implementation of health information
technology (HIT). Furthermore, the Federal Trade Com-
mission and Department of Justice have unevenly enforced
the antitrust laws, thereby fostering an increasingly severe
imbalance in the healthcare market in which dominant
health insurers enjoy the beneﬁt of largely unfettered con-
solidation at the cost of both consumers and providers. This
article traces the history of antitrust enforcement in
healthcare, describe the current marketplace, and suggest
the problems that must be addressed to restore balance to
the healthcare market and help to ensure an innovative and
efﬁcient healthcare system capable of meeting the demands
of the 21st century. Speciﬁcally, the writer explains how
innovative physician collaborations have been improperly
stiﬂed by the policies of the federal antitrust enforcement
agencies, and recommend that these policies be relaxed to
permit physicians more latitude to bargain collectively with
health insurers in conjunction with procompetitive clinical
integration efforts. The article also explains how the
unbridled consolidation of the health insurance industry has
resulted in higher premiums to consumers and lower com-
pensation to physicians, and recommends that further
consolidation be prohibited. Finally, the writer discusses
how health insurers with market power are improperly
undermining the physician-patient relationship, and rec-
ommend federal antitrust enforcement agencies take
appropriate steps to protect patients and their physicians
from this anticompetitive conduct. The article also suggests
such steps will require changes in three areas: (1) health
insurers must be prohibited from engaging in anticompeti-
tive activity; (2) the continuing improper consolidation of
the health insurance industry must be curtailed; and (3) the
physician community must be permitted to undertake the
collaborative activity necessary for the establishment of a
transparent, coordinated, and efﬁcient delivery system.
Introduction
The antitrust laws are ‘‘a consumer welfare prescription’’
[1]. They ensure competition and prohibit restraints on
trade that lead to higher prices, reduced quality, or injury to
market efﬁciencies for inputs such as hospital and physi-
cian services [2, 3].
Several antitrust statutes have application in the
healthcare area. A key federal statute for physicians is
Section 1 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. §1), which
provides:
‘‘Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
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nations, is declared to be illegal.’’
Large health insurers must also be required to comply
with the statutes involving mergers and monopolization.
Section 7 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. §18) prohibits
mergers that may ‘‘substantially…lessen competition,
or…tend to create a monopoly.’’ Section 2 of the Sherman
Act makes it unlawful for a company to ‘‘monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize’’ trade or commerce.
Because of the important economic underpinnings
reﬂected in the antitrust laws, penalties for violating them
are severe. Criminal violations of the Sherman Act are
felonies punishable by imprisonment for up to 3 years and/
or ﬁnes of up to $350,000 for individuals and $10 million
for corporations per violation (15 U.S.C. §1). A criminal
conviction virtually assures civil liability. Judgments for
civil violations often run in the millions of dollars, par-
ticularly because a private party can recover three times the
amount of damages actually sustained, as well as other
costs and attorneys’ fees incurred in prosecuting the
action—fees which often exceed $1 million.
This article traces the history of antitrust enforcement in
health care, which has often harmed physicians while at the
same time greatly beneﬁted health insurers. The discussion
then turns to the health care marketplace in 2009, and
documents four major factors that compel a need to revisit
antitrust enforcement policy: (1) uncontrolled health
insurer consolidation and market power; (2) healthcare
workforce shortages; (3) the rising disparity between
increasing physician practice costs and ﬂat or declining
reimbursements; and (4) the demand for investments in
health information technology. Finally, the discussion turns
to potential remedies for the imbalance in the marketplace
between health insurers and physicians, including changes
in antitrust enforcement policy to curtail continued health
insurer consolidation and prohibit anticompetitive conduct
by health insurers with market power on the one hand,
while relaxing the rules applicable to physicians to permit
procompetitive collaborations necessary for the optimal
implementation of health information technology and other
innovations necessary to an efﬁcient health care delivery
system.
Physicians and the Antitrust Laws
For many years, the general consensus was that the pro-
fessions were immune from the antitrust laws. However, in
1975 the landscape changed dramatically when the U.S.
Supreme Court issued its opinion in the case of Goldfarb v.
Va. State Bar [4], in which the high court concluded that
the antitrust laws applied to attorneys, and every other
profession, stating that the ‘‘nature of an occupation,
standing alone, does not provide sanctuary from the Sher-
man Act… nor is the public-service aspect of professional
practice controlling in determining whether §1 includes
professions.’’ Any doubt as to whether physicians were
covered by the Goldfarb decision was eliminated in Ari-
zona v. Maricopa County Medical Society [5], where the
U.S. Supreme Court found that an agreement among phy-
sicians to set maximum prices charged by those who
participated in a PPO network constituted a per se violation
of the Sherman Act. Under the per se rule, the practice is
deemed so manifestly anticompetitive in nature that it is
deemed illegal, without regard to its actual market impact.
Under the ‘‘rule of reason,’’ the standard more commonly
applied to an antitrust challenge, the anticompetitive con-
sequences of a challenged practice are weighed against its
purpose and procompetitive effect.
Unfortunately, the Maricopa decision went much farther
than just to conﬁrm that physicians were subject to the
antitrust laws. It applied the per se rule to outlaw a joint
contracting activity—the agreement to a maximum fee-
schedule—that was arguably necessary to the maintenance
of a physician network. Yet, as the proliferation of the
rental network PPO market has demonstrated, physician
rental networks clearly have a place in the healthcare
delivery system. Indeed, the Maricopa case came to the
Supreme Court in response to a request by the State of
Arizona for an early legal ruling that an agreement between
competitors to set maximum prices was illegal per se, just
as an agreement between competitors to set minimum
prices had long been declared to be ﬂatly illegal. The
parties to the case had engaged in only limited discovery by
the time of this request, so there was no factual record
before the U.S. Supreme Court on the potential efﬁciencies
of physician joint contracting. Thus, it should not be sur-
prising that the decision is in tension with other U.S.
Supreme Court cases holding similar joint arrangements in
other industries to be subject to the so-called rule of reason
[6], or that Maricopa was a 4-3 decision.
The application of the antitrust laws to physicians has
continued to be the subject of concern since the overly
broad Maricopa decision. Responding to concerns that the
antitrust laws were unduly stiﬂing healthcare innovation,
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Department of
Justice (DOJ) jointly issued Statements of Enforcement
Policy in Health Care (the ‘‘Statements’’) during the 1990s
in an effort to provide clearer guidance as to those activi-
ties the agencies would (or would not) ﬁnd problematic.
While these Statements are not binding on the courts, they
are important reﬂections of FTC/DOJ enforcement
priorities.
The initial version of the Statements was released in
September 1993 and contained eight separate policy
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Joint Ventures’’ [7]. Reﬂecting the Maricopa decision,
Statement 8 identiﬁed two features of particular impor-
tance: (1) the network’s percentage or ‘‘share’’ of the
physicians in each physician specialty practicing in the
relevant geographic markets; and (2) whether the physi-
cians had integrated their practices by sharing ‘‘substantial
ﬁnancial risk.’’ Only the sharing of ‘‘substantial ﬁnancial
risk’’ was sufﬁcient to allow a network to be evaluated
under a reasonableness standard. Other forms of integra-
tion—structural, functional, or transactional—were not
considered adequate to avoid per se condemnation.
According to the Statements, sharing ‘‘substantial
ﬁnancial risk’’ could be accomplished in one of two ways:
(1) by accepting ‘‘capitated’’ or ‘‘per-member per-month’’
payments; or (2) by incentivizing physicians to contain
costs through the use of a substantial withhold from pay-
ments. The existence of either type of substantial ﬁnancial
risk meant that the physician collaboration, if challenged,
would be evaluated under the rule of reason standard. The
absence of any evidence of substantial ﬁnancial risk would
result in summary condemnation of the collaboration as per
se illegal price ﬁxing [7]. As noted above, per se illegality
conclusively presumes the challenged practices unreason-
able. In other words, when a per se offense, like price ﬁxing
among competitors, is charged, all that must be established
is that the defendant has, in fact, engaged in the proscribed
practice.
With the rapid expansion of managed care in the 1990s,
the requirement of ﬁnancial risk-sharing as the deﬁning
feature of a legitimate physician network proved to be
unduly restrictive. In many regions of the country, physi-
cian capitation proved to be an unpopular and highly
controversial payment methodology. Employers wanted
broad networks that allowed patients a broad choice among
physicians, without perceived incentives to withhold or
ration care. Yet, the deﬁnition of ‘‘substantial ﬁnancial
risk’’ adopted by the agencies creates a signiﬁcant barrier
to the participation of physician-led contracting networks.
In the 1996 version of the Statements, the agencies
recognized a second type of integration that could qualify a
physician network for rule of reason treatment—‘‘Clinical
Integration.’’ Clinical integration, as deﬁned in the State-
ments, is evidenced ‘‘by the network implementing an
active and ongoing program to evaluate and modify prac-
tice patterns by the network’s physician participants and
create a high degree of interdependence and cooperation
among the physicians to control costs and ensure quality’’
[8]. Clinical integration as so deﬁned represented a sort of
‘‘as if’’ standard, i.e., a physician network that acted ‘‘as if’’
its members shared ﬁnancial risk—by instituting the types
of efﬁciencies associated with ﬁnancial risk sharing—
might qualify for rule of reason treatment despite the
absence of ‘‘substantial ﬁnancial risk.’’ For several years
following the publication of the 1996 Statements, the
agencies gave no further guidance on the meaning of
clinical integration.
In 2002, however, the FTC issued a staff advisory letter
addressing the clinical integration proposal of MedSouth,
Inc., an independent practice association based in Denver,
CO, with over 400 physicians [9]. And in 2007, the FTC
issued a similar staff advisory letter to the Greater
Rochester Independent Practice Association, Inc. (GRIPA),
a network based in Rochester, NY, with over 600 physician
members [10]. The MedSouth and GRIPA letters demon-
strate how high the bar has been set for physician networks
seeking to integrate clinically. While the MedSouth and
GRIPA proposals are not identical, they bear substantial
similarities. Both networks were originally built for capi-
tation, but needed to adapt in the face of market resistance.
Thus, both MedSouth and GRIPA were constructed ‘‘as if’’
the physicians were sharing substantial ﬁnancial risk. Only
when risk contracting proved to be commercially infeasible
did the networks seek FTC approval for their clinical
integration programs. Both MedSouth and GRIPA made
major investments, using myriad consultants, lawyers, and
technology experts to assist in the effort. Both networks
invested in electronic medical records and tracking tech-
nology to permit their network physicians to share
information on their patients and to monitor data relating to
utilization and medical outcomes. Both networks devel-
oped clinical practice guidelines and procedures for
monitoring compliance, and both networks were ‘‘nonex-
clusive,’’ meaning that payors choosing not to support the
clinically integrated program would not lose access to any
desirable physicians who were participating in the network.
Importantly, the FTC found no anticompetitive motivation
for either network.
Despite the substantial investment of resources, neither
MedSouth nor GRIPA achieved FTC approval easily or
without signiﬁcant ongoing conditions and caveats. Both
FTC advisory letters reﬂected extensive agency investiga-
tion of the networks’ history, purposes, contracting
mechanisms, disciplinary methods for noncompliant phy-
sicians, and strategies for producing efﬁciencies. Each
investigation involved a searching examination of the
so-called ‘‘ancillarity’’ [11] of the networks’ pricing
mechanisms to its efﬁciency-enhancing potential. Ancil-
larity refers to whether a pricing mechanism is ‘‘reasonably
related to the integration and reasonably necessary to
achieve its pro-competitive beneﬁts.’’ Each letter also left
the FTC plenty of room to bring a later enforcement action
if the networks’ operations could not later be shown to
produce substantial efﬁciencies.
The MedSouth and GRIPA advisory letters reﬂect the
extremely high level of clinical integration required for
Volume 467, Number 11, November 2009 Physician Collective Bargaining 3019
123FTC approval. As a practical matter, absent vast resources,
such as those available to MedSouth and GRIPA, most
physicians are effectively barred from forming physician
networks. Unfortunately, unless they are employed in an
integrated medical group, physicians cannot work collab-
oratively on costly and complex healthcare quality
initiatives nor participate in balanced negotiations with
health insurers without such networks.
Outside the healthcare context, courts and the federal
agencies themselves appear to apply a more ﬂexible anal-
ysis than that found in the Statements. For example, in the
Joint FTC/DOJ Guidelines on Competitor Collaboration,
there is no mention of ﬁnancial or clinical integration.
Instead, the Competitor Collaboration Guidelines ask more
generally whether a joint venture involves ‘‘an efﬁciency-
enhancing integration of economic activity’’ and whether
any restraints are ‘‘reasonably related to the integration and
reasonably necessary to achieve its pro-competitive bene-
ﬁts’’ [12]. The Supreme Court, too, in its joint venture
cases has rejected any ﬁxed formulation of what may
constitute integration sufﬁcient to warrant rule of reason
treatment [6].
Health Insurers and the Antitrust Laws
Health insurers, like physicians, were originally thought to
be immune from the antitrust laws. This changed in 1944
when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in United States v.
South-Eastern Underwriters Association [13] that Congress
had the power to regulate insurance companies, despite the
then prevailing view that ‘‘insurance is not commerce.’’
However, unlike physicians, insurers were successful in
reinstating much of their prior immunity the next year when
Congress enacted the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Under that
Act, the federal antitrust laws do not apply to the ‘‘business
of insurance’’ as long as the state regulates in that area,
except in cases of boycott, coercion, and intimidation.
While the precise scope of the McCarran-Ferguson Act
immunity remains unclear, it is not absolute, particularly
when it comes to merger challenges. Because health
insurers are both sellers of insurance to consumers and
buyers of medical services, mergers and other conduct
involving health insurers potentially can raise issues related
to both monopoly (only one seller) power and monopsony
(only one buyer) power. As discussed below, health
insurers have entered into consent decrees with respect to
certain mergers.
The 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines (‘‘Merger
Guidelines’’) specify that ‘‘mergers should not be permitted
to create or enhance market power or to facilitate its
exercise’’ [14]. As with the FTC/DOJ Statements, these
Merger Guidelines do not bind courts, but they do describe
the Agencies’ enforcement priorities. Market power ‘‘is the
ability proﬁtably to maintain prices above competitive
levels for a signiﬁcant period of time’’ [14 at n.9]. A
merger also may ‘‘lessen competition on dimensions other
than price, such as product quality, service, or innovation’’
[14 at n.6].
To identify mergers that are likely to cause competitive
problems, the Merger Guidelines provide for the exami-
nation of several issues, including: whether the merger, in
light of market concentration and other factors that char-
acterize the market, would be likely to have adverse
competitive effects; whether entry would be timely, likely,
and sufﬁcient either to deter or to counteract the compet-
itive effects of concern; whether there are efﬁciency gains
from the merger that meet the Agencies’ criteria for
examination; and whether, but for the merger, either party
to the transaction would be likely to fail, causing its assets
to exit the market [14 at §0.2].
As discussed below, the health insurance market in the
United States is now highly concentrated. While the new
administration may institute change, to date the FTC and
DOJ have shown little interest in restricting additional
mergers, and no interest in addressing complaints of
monopolization by dominant health insurers.
The Current Healthcare Market
Over the past several years, healthcare market conditions
have changed in major ways that suggest a need to revisit
the antitrust landscape. Health insurers have consolidated
to the point that the ability of physicians to advocate on
behalf of their patients and themselves has been severely
compromised. At the same time, and exacerbated by this
imbalance, shortages of healthcare providers are becoming
increasingly acute, as discussed in detail below. Simulta-
neously, the aging population is creating a greater demand
for healthcare services. Finally, market and regulatory
developments are increasingly placing a premium on the
use of HIT and the measurement and improvement of
medical care.
While beyond the scope of this paper, the writer notes
that community hospitals have also been impacted by
predatory contracting tactics employed by the insurance
industry. Required by state law to maintain licensed ser-
vices, including skilled nursing, and burdened by
technology cost outlays, community nonproﬁt hospitals
have been very vulnerable to predatory contracting tactics.
And like physicians, hospitals are prohibited from engag-
ing in collective bargaining. As a result, these hospitals
have in many instances downsized or gone out of business,
leaving the public more vulnerable to pandemics and other
natural disasters and emergencies.
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and Consolidation
The health insurer market has changed substantially due to
a wave of mergers over the past decade, steadily eroding
the competitive payor market [15]. In fact, during the last
decade, there have been over 400 health insurer mergers.
Tellingly, only three mergers have been challenged by the
DOJ. As a result, the payor market has consolidated and
payors enjoy substantial negotiating leverage over provid-
ers in most markets. The AMA has just completed the 2008
edition of its publication tracking the consolidation of the
health insurance industry entitled ‘‘Competition in health
insurance: A comprehensive study of U.S. markets’’ [16].
In this most recent study, the AMA found that 94% of the
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) it examined are
highly concentrated using standards relied on by the federal
antitrust enforcement agencies. Further, in 89% of those
MSAs, a single health insurer holds at least 30% of the
market for commercial health insurance [16].
To put this in perspective, in 2000, the two largest health
insurers, Aetna and UnitedHealth Group (‘‘United’’), had a
total combined membership of 32 million people. Due to
aggressive merger activity since 2000, including United’s
acquisition of California-based PaciﬁCare Health Systems,
Inc., and John Deere Health Plan in 2005, United’s mem-
bership alone has grown to 33 million. Similarly,
WellPoint, Inc. (‘‘Wellpoint’’), the company born of the
merger of Anthem, Inc. (originally Blue Cross Blue Shield
of Indiana), and WellPoint Health Networks, Inc. (origi-
nally Blue Cross of California), now owns Blue Cross
plans in 14 states, covering approximately 34 million
Americans [17]. Most recently, United acquired Sierra
Health Systems in Nevada, allowing United to acquire over
50 percent of the Nevada market, including a 90 percent
share of the health maintenance organization (‘‘HMO’’)
market.
The power garnered by health insurers through rapid,
large-scale consolidation has not been used to the advan-
tage of consumers or providers. Patient premiums have
soared in this increasingly consolidated market and phy-
sician reimbursement has decreased. As premiums have
risen, many employers have stopped providing coverage;
particularly those ﬁrms with three to nine employees [18],
substantially limited or reduced the scope of beneﬁts pro-
vided, and/or asked employees to pay a higher share of the
overall premium, thus effectively shrinking the scope of
coverage. The 2008 Kaiser Family Foundation survey
found that large ﬁrms (classiﬁed as having 200 or more
workers) provide 99% of their full time employees with
health insurance, as opposed to 40% in ﬁrms with 3-9
employees. This ﬁgure was 56% for small ﬁrms in 1999.
As of 2006, premiums for employer-based health insurance
rose more than twice as fast as overall inﬂation and wages
for the seventh straight year [19]. Since 2000, the amount
that workers pay toward family healthcare coverage has
skyrocketed 84% [19] and 5 million fewer workers were
receiving job-based coverage in 2006 than in 2000 [19].
During the same period, average wages increased only 20%
[19]. These soaring costs have directly contributed to an
increase in the number of uninsured. Research shows that a
1% increase in premiums results in a net increase in the
uninsured of 164,000 individuals [20].
Nor have physicians beneﬁted from these premium
increases. To the contrary, powerful insurers have depres-
sed physician revenues [21]. The median real income of all
U.S. physicians remained ﬂat during the 1990s and has
since decreased [22]. The average net income for primary
care physicians, after adjusting for inﬂation, declined 10%
from 1995 to 2005, and the net income for medical spe-
cialists declined 2% [22].
This reduction in physician income has not beneﬁted
patients, and indeed may have harmed them. The phe-
nomenon of lower physician fees paid by insurers
potentially resulting in higher prices to patients was
emphasized by R. Hewitt Pate, a former Assistant Attorney
General of the Antitrust Division, in a statement before the
Senate Judiciary Committee:
‘‘A casual observer might believe that if a merger
lowers the price the merged ﬁrm pays for its inputs,
consumers will necessarily beneﬁt. The logic seems
to be that because the input purchaser is paying less,
the input purchaser’s customers should expect to pay
less also. But that is not necessarily the case. Input
prices can fall for two entirely different reasons, one
of which arises from true economic efﬁciency that
will tend to result in lower prices for ﬁnal consumers.
The other, in contrast, represents an efﬁciency-
reducing exercise of market power that will reduce
economic welfare, lower prices for suppliers, and
may well result in higher prices charged to ﬁnal
consumers.’’
Health plan executives and shareholders, on the other
hand, have reaped enormous monopoly proﬁts [23]. The
proﬁt margins of the major national ﬁrms experienced
double-digit growth between 2001 and 2008 [23 at pp.
19–20]. United and WellPoint, speciﬁcally, had 7 years
of consecutive double-digit growth that has ranged from
20% to 70% year after year (through 2003) [23 at pp.
19–20].
In addition to affecting costs, payments, and proﬁts, this
consolidation has created an extreme imbalance in health
insurer-physician contracting that threatens all aspects of
patient care. Health insurers are able to dictate important
aspects of patient care and material contract terms to
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p.5]. Physicians have little to no ability to inﬂuence insurer
contracts that touch on virtually every aspect of the patient-
physician relationship. Many contracts are essentially
‘‘contracts of adhesion’’—standardized contracts that are
submitted to a weaker party on a take-it or leave-it basis
and do not provide for negotiation. This means that phy-
sicians must agree to contracts that often include provisions
that make it difﬁcult, if not impossible, for them to promote
what they deem to be the optimal patient care. For exam-
ple, many contracts deﬁne ‘‘medically necessary care’’ in a
manner that allows the health insurer to overrule the phy-
sician’s medical judgment and require the lowest cost, but
not necessarily optimal, care for the patient. Others require
compliance with undeﬁned ‘‘utilization management’’ or
‘‘quality assurance’’ programs that often are nothing more
than thinly disguised cost-cutting programs that penalize
physicians for providing care they deem necessary. Some
have gone so far as to require the physician to suffer a
signiﬁcant ﬁnancial penalty if the physician fails to use a
designated setting for services, even when the use of that
setting would jeopardize the patient’s health or impose a
substantial hardship.
These contracts also often dictate key ﬁnancial terms in
ways that no supplier of services in any other industry
sector would tolerate. For example, these contracts may
refer to ‘‘fee schedules’’ that are never provided and can be
revised unilaterally by the health insurer. Many contracts
allow the health insurer to change any term of the contract
unilaterally. These contracts also frequently contain such
unreasonable provisions as ‘‘most favored payor’’ clau-
ses—clauses requiring physicians to bill the dominant
health insurer at a level equal to the lowest amount the
physician charges any other health insurer in the region.
This permits the dominant health insurer to guarantee that
it will have the lowest input costs in the market, making it
that much more difﬁcult for new payors to enter the mar-
ket. They also contain ‘‘all products’’ clauses—clauses
requiring physicians to participate in all products offered
by a health insurer as a condition of participation in any
one product. This often includes the health insurer
reserving the right to introduce new plans and designate a
physician’s participation in those future plans. Given the
rapid development of new products and plans, the inability
of physicians to select which products and plans they want
to participate in makes it difﬁcult for physicians to manage
their practices effectively.
Despite the improper restrictions and potential dangers
of these contracts, the current imbalance in the market
dictates that physicians typically have no choice but to
accept them. Any alleged ‘‘choice’’ is illusory given that
choosing to leave the network often means terminating
patient relationships and drastically reducing or losing
one’s medical practice. In my experience, the strong per-
sonal relationships physicians form with their patients
often inﬂuence them to accept contract terms that they
would not accept but for those personal bonds. In addition,
because medical services cannot be stored or exported,
physicians have limited options for selling their services. If
physicians were to refuse the terms of a major health
insurer, they would likely suffer a signiﬁcant loss. Conse-
quently, a physician’s ability to terminate a relationship
with a health insurer depends on that physician’s ability to
make up for the loss by switching to an alternative insurer,
or other purchasers of the physician’s services.
Where alternative purchasers are lacking, physicians are
forced to accept unfair contracts. The DOJ, in its 1999
challenge of the Aetna/Prudential merger recognized that
there are substantial barriers to physicians expeditiously
replacing lost revenue by changing health plans. It also
noted that this imposes a permanent loss of revenue [24].
The DOJ reiterated this position in its challenge to the
UnitedHealth Group/PaciﬁCare merger [25]. Furthermore,
even where there are other insurers, physicians are limited
in their ability to encourage patients to switch plans, as
patients can typically switch employer-sponsored plans
only during the once a year open enrollment period, and
even then, patients have limited options and may incur
considerable out-of-pocket costs should they wish to
change insurers to follow their physicians [25].
In this environment, the antitrust enforcement agencies
need to do far more to protect competition in health insurer
markets. The continued enforcement focus on physician
collaboration efforts is inappropriate given the scant like-
lihood in most payor-dominated markets that physician
networks would be able to exercise market power in their
negotiations with insurers. The brutal fact is that health
insurers are aware that given the cost of ofﬁce overhead,
the vast majority of physicians must contract with all major
payors if they are to remain viable, no matter how unrea-
sonable the contract terms.
Healthcare Workforce Shortages
The problems described above have exacerbated the phy-
sician workforce shortage. The Association of American
Medical Colleges (AAMC) publication ‘‘The Complexities
of Physician Supply and Demand: Projections Through
2025’’ released in October 2008 highlights that the United
States faces an increasing physician workforce shortage
[26]. Numerous factors such as an aging population which
requires more health resources and a growing population
create added future demand on the US health system. On
the supply side, key factors, including that (1) one-third of
the active physicians (250,000) are over age 55 years and
3022 Schiff Clinical Orthopaedics and Related Research
1
123likely to retire by 2020; and (2) the newest generation of
physicians may be unwilling to work the extraordinarily
long hours that prior generations of physicians routinely
worked, will add additional strains to this expected phy-
sician supply dilemma [27].
A brief discussion of the current and projected demand
for physician services is illustrative of the problem. The
U.S. Census Bureau projected the 2006 U.S. population
would be approximately 300 million. Medical care was
provided tothis population by 256,500 FTE general primary
care physicians (general and family practice, general
internal medicine, and general pediatrics); 90,900 FTE
medical specialty physicians (cardiovascular disease, gas-
troenterology, internal medicine subspecialties, nephrology,
pulmonology, and other medical specialties); 142,400 FTE
surgeons (general surgery, obstetrics and gynecology,
ophthalmology, orthopedic surgery, otolaryngology, tho-
racic surgery, urology, and other surgical specialties); and
190,800 FTE physicians classiﬁed as other patient care
(anesthesiology, emergency medicine, neurology, pathol-
ogy, psychiatry, radiology, and other specialties) [26]. In
2025, the U.S. population is projected to be 350 million.
This population will receive medical care from an estimated
272,700 FTE general primary care physicians, 117,600 FTE
medical specialty physicians, 138,800 FTE surgeons and
205,700 FTE physicians classiﬁed as other patient care [26].
The AAMC predicts these modest increases in physician
supply will be inadequate to meet the needs (Fig. 1).
Recognizing that the expansion of U.S. medical school
capacity will require 10 or more years, the AAMC has
recommended a 30% increase in U.S. medical school
enrollment and an expansion of Graduate Medical Educa-
tion (GME) positions to accommodate this growth [28].
Nonetheless, with the baby boom generation entering
retirement, and the extensive academic and clinical time
required to produce physicians, simply educating and
training more physicians will not be enough to address these
shortages. Additional and complex changes to improve
efﬁciencies, to reconﬁgure health service delivery, and to
better use of the nation’s physicians will also be needed. But
change of this magnitude requires ﬂexibility and resources.
Increasing Disparity between Practice Costs
and Reimbursements
Further compounding the problem is the accelerating dis-
parity between the increases in physician practice costs and
the ﬂat or declining payments physicians are receiving for
their services. This problem is most acute with respect to
the Medicare fee schedule, as currently impacted by the
misnamed ‘‘Sustainable Growth Rate’’ (SGR) (Fig. 2).
Indeed, the chart below depicts a conservative picture of
the problem, as the physician cost data graphed on this
chart is from the government’s Medicare Economic Index.
The physician practice cost surveys conducted by the
Medical Group Management Association suggest that the
inﬂation rate in physician practice expenses is far greater
(Fig. 3).
Consumerism and Health Information
Technology (HIT)
Another ongoing and major change in the healthcare
market is the shift towards consumerism and the concom-
itant demand for more accessible health information. There
Most Plausible Demand 
Baseline Demand 
Most Plausible Supply 
Baseline Supply 
Fig. 1 A projection of numbers of FTE physicians 2006–2025
suggests the number will be inadequate. (  2008 Association of
American Medical Colleges. All rights reserved. Reproduced with
permission.)
Fig. 2 Physician costs and Medicare reimbursement (abscissa) over
time; there is a projected increase in the gap. (Prepared by the
American Medical Association, Division of Economic and Health
Policy Research.) (  2008 American Medical Association. All rights
reserved. Reproduced with permission.)
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123are increasingly focused efforts on developing methods of
promoting and measuring quality. At the same time, the
federal government is seeking to encourage physicians and
other providers to invest in HIT to facilitate the collection
and sharing of clinical data. On the payor side, employers
are favoring health plans that put increasing responsibility
on patients to participate actively in choosing (and paying
for) care. For physicians, who still practice predominantly
in small groups, network arrangements provide a viable
way of achieving the economies of scale necessary to
participate in these initiatives, where optimal use of the
integrative potential of the technology requires substantial
capital and coordinated decision-making [29].
The shift towards performance-based reimbursement
provides a good example of the strong incentives for
physicians to collaborate with one another to collect and
analyze quality data. ‘‘Pay-for-performance’’ (P4P) reim-
bursement is ‘‘now routinely used by both private and
public payors in the U.S. healthcare system’’ [30]. A
majority of commercial HMOs use P4P and recent legis-
lation requires Medicare to adopt performance-based
incentives [31]. As the adoption of P4P spreads and its use
expands, physicians in small practices will be increasingly
motivated to align with networks in order to have the
capability to participate in these programs. However, and
despite the potential for such arrangements to enhance
efﬁciency, networking among physicians will not prolif-
erate in the absence of a change in current antitrust
enforcement policies.
Potential Remedies to the Current Malaise
As the preceding discussion illustrates, the profound
imbalance in the marketplace between the health insurers
who collect premiums to pay for medical care and the
physicians who provide medical care, has resulted in an
increasingly unfair and inefﬁcient healthcare delivery sys-
tem. The playing ﬁeld between health insurers and
physicians must be leveled to remedy the situation and
restore the true competition and creativity that are sorely
needed to ensure all Americans have access to affordable,
quality medical care. This will require changes in three
areas: (1) health insurers must be prohibited from engaging
in anticompetitive activity; (2) the continuing improper
consolidation of the health insurance industry must be
curtailed; and (3) the physician community must be freed
to undertake the collaborative activity necessary for the
establishment of a transparent, coordinated, and efﬁcient
delivery system.
Prohibit Health Insurers from Engaging
in Anticompetitive Activity
Health insurers throughout the country have amassed
substantial market power and must be prohibited from
exercising that power in ways that are anticompetitive. It is
not clear that new laws are required to accomplish this;
there are already many laws at both the federal and state
levels that could be deployed for this purpose. Rather, it
appears that the principle change required is a reevalua-
tion of the premise apparently shared by most antitrust
enforcers that health insurers consistently act as surro-
gates for consumers. As the prior discussion indicates
consumers as well as physicians have suffered as ever more
powerful health insurers have increased both premiums and
proﬁts. Predatory conduct by health insurers is at least as
bad for consumer welfare as predatory conduct which
occurs in other industries. If anything, prosecutorial
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Fig. 3 Cumulative percent change
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association 2008. (  2008 Medical
Group Management Association. Rep-
rinted with permission.)
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123discretion should be exercised more aggressively in this
market, particularly given the lack of accountability that
this sector has enjoyed.
Curtail the Continuing Consolidation of the Health
Insurance Industry
For the reasons discussed above, it is also critical that the
health insurance industry not be allowed to become further
consolidated. Again, there appear to be laws at both the
federal and state levels to preclude further consolidation in
any circumstance where the effect of the consolidation will
be to lessen competition. The principal problem appears to
be a failure of enforcement. However, given their focus on
and expertise with health insurance, it does appear that
state insurance commissioners could play a more important
role in this area.
Permit Physicians to Participate in Procompetitive
Collaborations
Finally, antitrust enforcement policies directed at physi-
cians must be reevaluated. Joint contracting by physicians
in a network can result in extensive collaboration to
improve and measure care and to provide cost savings for
both payors and physicians. On the payor side, joint con-
tracting can make it possible for a payor to obtain ready
access to a panel of physicians offering broad geographic
and specialty coverage [32]. Since physicians still practice
predominantly in solo or small group practices, creating a
physician panel can be a very time-consuming and
expensive task, and can be a barrier to entry or expansion
for new or less signiﬁcant insurers. In its complaint in
United States v. Aetna, the DOJ noted that ‘‘effective new
entry for an HMO or HMO/POS plan in Houston or Dallas
typically takes 2 to 3 years and costs approximately
$50,000,000’’ [24]. When the physicians themselves
undertake the initial task of network formation, payors may
substantially reduce the costs of the payors’ entry and
expansion. Indeed, any doubt concerning the intrinsic
efﬁciency of physician networks should be eliminated by
the thriving rental PPO network business that has emerged
to supplement inadequate networks. Joint contracting thus
has the potential both to reduce costs for payors and to
increase competition in payor markets. These are cogni-
zable beneﬁts, with real potential to create efﬁciencies,
lower premiums and expand coverage for patients.
Joint contracting can also make physician contracting
more efﬁcient and lead to better-informed contracting
decisions. Most physician practices are simply too small to
afford to hire business advisers and lawyers to review their
contracts with payors. These physician practices do not
have the in-house resources to analyze complex contracts.
Whereas payors have sophisticated actuarial and ﬁnancial
resources that enable them to structure and evaluate com-
plex contract proposals, physicians are often in the dark
when they consider a contract. By pooling their resources,
physicians can spread the costs associated with the analysis
of payor contracts, and develop appropriate counteroffers
that can beneﬁt patient, physicians, and payors. The effect
is to enhance the efﬁciency of the physicians’ practices and
make them more responsive to the demands of competition.
Likewise, joint contracting can provide the resources
physicians need for creating networks that will facilitate
collaboration on HIT. The beneﬁts of HIT fall into two
basic categories. First, the system may reduce the costs of
running a medical practice. For example, it can eliminate
the need to archive and store medical records. Medical
records are rarely lost and communication between physi-
cians is enhanced and preserved. Second, these systems can
create cost savings by increasing the availability of patient
data and, correspondingly, by eliminating the duplication
of services to patients. For instance, HIT may reduce the
frequency of primary and specialty physicians ordering the
same test. Currently, however, physicians are unable to
capture the ﬁnancial returns or substantial beneﬁts from
HIT that are necessary to offset the high implementation
costs. Today, those beneﬁts and ﬁnancial returns accrue
mainly to health insurers, rather than physicians. Thus, it is
unlikely, as noted by the Congressional Budget Ofﬁce, that
a solo practitioner or a small group practice will realize any
real, internal cost savings from information technology
systems [33].
This is a classic problem recognized in economics—the
problem of externalities. An externality arises when an
individual cannot recover the costs of investing in an asset
because most of the beneﬁts fall to an individual whom the
investor has no way of charging for the beneﬁt. Building
roads is a good example of the problem of externalities, as
is putting air ﬁltration systems on factories. When the
externality is large and the upfront costs for the investment
are sizable in relation to the expected recoverable beneﬁt, a
market failure occurs. This market failure means the
investment is not made and consumers are made worse off.
In the healthcare context, the beneﬁts of costly HIT sys-
tems [34] do not produce the necessary incentives for
physicians to invest in them. Acquiring and implementing
an Electronic Health Record (EHR) system, for example,
entails a major ﬁnancial investment. One study examining
such acquisition costs for solo or small group practices
estimated that ‘‘[i]nitial EHR costs were approximately
$44,000 per full-time equivalent (FTE) provider per year,
and ongoing costs were about $8,500 per FTE provider per
year.’’ For this reason, only 14% of physicians have
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partner practices, accounting for about half of all doctors,
had the lowest level of comprehensive HIT use—7.1% of
solo practitioners and 9.7% of those with a partner [35].
While joint negotiation may increase the costs for
physician services in the short term, it will reduce overall
system costs in the long term. HIT systems will create
efﬁciencies that will improve care and likely reduce costs.
According to the CBO report, HIT has the potential, if
adopted widely and used effectively, to save the healthcare
sector about $80 billion annually (in 2005 dollars) [33].
Thus, gains in the form of market efﬁciencies, reduced
utilization, and increased availability of patient data will
offset higher costs for networks to implement HIT. The
FTC recognized this in its GRIPA advisory letter:
‘‘Higher unit prices may be of little concern to a
customer if they occur within integrated programs
that result in lower total costs (e.g., through elimi-
nation of unnecessary and inappropriate utilization of
services) and higher quality (e.g., better medical
outcomes)’’ [11].
How well HIT lives up to its potential, however,
depends in part on how effectively ﬁnancial incentives are
realigned to encourage the optimal use of the technology’s
capabilities [33]. In the current environment, health insur-
ers, the entities most likely to beneﬁt from cost savings,
have demonstrated little interest in implementing these
systems and are unlikely to make substantial investments in
HIT in the future. Given the expense of HIT implementa-
tion and the inability of physicians, the group to which the
burden of implementation has fallen, to capture the
majority of beneﬁts and returns, physicians should be
permitted to negotiate jointly with payors to properly
allocate cost savings. Without the ability to recoup some of
the expense of these systems by joining a network and
achieving increased contracting efﬁciencies, it will be
difﬁcult, if not impossible, for many physicians across the
country to make the heavy investments in time and money
that the adoption of such a system would require.
Joint contracting is also essential for those physicians in
small or solo practices who wish to participate in perfor-
mance-based payment initiatives.The dataand coordination
requiredfortheseprogramsisoutofreachforthemajorityof
physicians.TheFTCinitsGRIPAadvisoryletterrecognized
this when it noted that implementing a program in which
different subsets of physicians are participating in different
payorcontracts‘‘couldinterferewiththenetwork’sabilityto
effectively gather data and monitor and evaluate physician
performance under the program.’’ Currently, most perfor-
mance-based payment initiatives are speciﬁcally targeted at
medical groups or networks rather than small practices. As a
Commonwealth Fund study on P4P recently noted:
‘‘Smaller groups generally have few incentives for
care coordination, as they usually do not receive
payment beyond the evaluation and management fees
they are able to bill for acute visits. However, by
banding together under the umbrella of organizations,
and becoming eligible for performance payments
through [the Medicare P4P Demonstration Project] or
similar incentive programs, they have more motiva-
tion and support for care coordination’’ [36].
Physicians who predominantly still practice in small
groups lack the economic scale. By teaming up in a net-
work, small practices may gain the magnitude for the care
coordination, aggregation of data, and purchasing power
required for the implementation of these initiatives.
There are several potential strategies to achieve the goal
of increased ﬂexibility for physician collaboration. First, it
is important that physicians are aware of ‘‘clinical inte-
gration’’ and other options the Federal antitrust enforcers
have acknowledged as acceptable.
Second, major changes that have taken place in the
market since the current FTC enforcement guidelines were
drafted. In this regard, the AMA is actively working to
have the guidelines revised. AMA has submitted a formal
request to the FTC entitled: ‘‘Physician Networks and
Antitrust: A Call for a More Flexible Enforcement Policy’’
[37].
Finally, legislation at the federal and/or state level is
warranted to encourage physician collaboration. At the
federal level, an option that deserves serious consideration
is the countervailing market power approach which has
been suggested by former Congressman Tom Campbell
[38]. Under this proposal, physician groups would be
allowed to bargain collectively without fear of violating the
antitrust laws to the extent the group had no greater market
power than that enjoyed by the health insurer with which it
was bargaining. A state is also free to exempt itself from
federal antitrust rules by enacting a law which both afﬁr-
matively expresses a decision to substitute regulation for a
market competition as the best way of achieving a state
policy objective, and creates a mechanism ensuring that the
state ‘‘actively supervises’’ the resulting conduct to ensure
that the state policy objective is indeed being promoted.
Discussion
In this paper, the writer has argued there is a profound
imbalance in the marketplace between the health insurers
who collect premiums to pay for medical care and the
physicians who provide medical care. Such an imbalance
has resulted in an increasingly unfair and inefﬁcient
healthcare delivery system. Further, FTC and DOJ
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123enforcement policies have led to aggressive antitrust
actions primarily against physicians. This has had the
counterproductive result of inhibiting the physician com-
munity from engaging in the innovative collaborations
necessary to take optimal advantage of HIT. Unfortunately,
these same agencies have adopted a largely ‘‘hands-off’’
policy towards the health insurers, resulting in the unfet-
tered consolidation of the health insurance industry. The
playing ﬁeld between health insurers and physicians should
be leveled to remedy the situation. This will require
changes in three major areas: (1) health insurers should be
prohibited from engaging in anticompetitive activity; (2)
the continuing improper consolidation of the health insur-
ance industry should be curtailed; and (3) the physician
community should be freed to undertake the collaborative
activity necessary to the establishment of a transparent,
coordinated, and efﬁcient delivery system.
Some economists have suggested that increased con-
solidation of health insurers will lead to increased
efﬁciency and, concomitantly, that federal antitrust
enforcement policy has properly prioritized the elimination
of physician ‘‘cartels.’’ These economists suggest that
health insurers, as purchasers of health care services, act as
surrogates for consumers, driving down physician reim-
bursement for the public good.
In this paper, the writer has argued that these economists
are wrong.
The evidence suggests that health insurers, as a result of
the consolidation of the market, are exercising both
monopoly and monopsony power in many communities.
These insurers are not sharing with consumers the bulk of
the ‘‘savings’’ they have achieved by driving down pro-
vider reimbursement levels and in fact may be perversely
increasing the cost of care by increasing physician work-
force scarcity issues and slowing the adoption of HIT.
Given that physician incomes are ﬂat or declining, the
continued focus on physician ‘‘cartels’’ seems unwarranted.
Additional studies on the connection between health
insurance premium increases and the relative consolidation
of the health insurance would be helpful to develop a more
robust understanding of the health insurance marketplace.
Similarly, studies examining the impact of the plethora of
FTC and DOJ enforcement actions against physicians
would be helpful to understand whether these prosecutions
have ultimately beneﬁted the salient patient populations.
Importantly, the healthcare antitrust landscape has
changed. This environment is very different from the early
1980s when the U.S. Supreme Court decided Maricopa.
The lack of opportunities for physicians to collaborate on
important initiatives must be reexamined and revised—
either through judicial, administrative or legislative activ-
ity. As the increasingly inadequate supply of physicians
demonstrates, the status quo is not sustainable. To achieve
a truly efﬁcient healthcare delivery system capable of
meeting the challenges of the 21st century, including the
demands of an increasing Medicare population, the phy-
sicians who provide the care must be allowed—and
encouraged—to collaborate and innovate as critical par-
ticipants in the healthcare marketplace.
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